Japan\u27s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the Government\u27s Discretion of Prosecution by Fukurai, Hiroshi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions:  
Lay Oversight of the Government’s Discretion 
of Prosecution 
Hiroshi Fukurai, Ph.D.*∗ 
I.	   INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 2	  
II.	   THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW COMMISSION 
AND ITS OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL PROSECUTION .................. 5	  
A.	   The Original Conception and Creation................................. 5	  
B.	   The 2004 PRC Act and the New Legally Binding Authority8	  
C.	   The PRC Selection Procedure............................................. 12	  
III.	   THE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE 
JAPANESE PROSECUTION ................................................................. 15	  
A.	   The Asahi Stampede Incident............................................. 15	  
B.	   The Fukuchisen Derailment Incident.................................. 18	  
IV.	   LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW 
COMMISSION:  EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS ................... 21	  
A.	   The 2005–2006 PRC Survey .............................................. 21	  
                                                 
*
∗ Professor of Sociology & Legal Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA (E-
mail:  hfukurai@ucsc.edu, Telephone:  831-459-2971, Fax:  831-459-3518).  This research 
was supported by the University of California, Office of President, Pacific Rim Research 
Program (Award#:19900-485212); the 2006 Abe Fellowship Program administered by the 
Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies in 
cooperation with funds provided by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership; 
and the 2009 Toyota Foundation Grant.  For assistance with collecting and processing the 
data reported herein, we wish to thank Naoko Tamura, who helped conduct personal 
interviews of former prosecutorial review commission members in Japan and Charlotte 
Nordstrom, who did extensive research on various crimes committed by American military 
personnel in the Island of Okinawa since 1945.   Lastly our special appreciation is 
extended to Marilyn Chapin, Ann McCardy, and Barbara Lawrence at the University of 
California, Santa Cruz for their research support; and Ryukyu University Professors 
Tetsumi Takara, Masaaki Gabe, Masahide Ishihara, and Shin Yamashiro, and Senshu 
University Professor Haruhiko Kanegae who provided valuable assistance and support to 
this ongoing project in Okinawa.  Translations are my own unless otherwise provided.  The 
earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the Annual Conference of the Law and 
Society Association Meeting in Denver, Colorado in May 2009. 
 
2 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 6 
 
B.	   Deliberative Experiences .................................................... 22	  
C.	   Perceptions about Lay  Participation .................................. 23	  
D.	   Confidence in the Criminal Justice System and the News 
Media .......................................................................................... 25	  
E.	   Lessons from PRC Participation and Experience ............... 25	  
V.	   DISCUSSION:  FUTURE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE LAY OVERSIGHT 
OF GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETION OF PROSECUTION ........................ 29	  
A.	   Misfeasance Allegation Against Political Heavyweights... 31	  
B.	   Indictment of Military Personnel and Their Dependents.... 33	  
C.	   Okinawa and Environmental Devastation .......................... 35	  
D.	   Potential Problems of the PRC’s Power to Review Alleged 
Military Crimes........................................................................... 39	  
VI.	   CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 41	  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 2010, a former deputy chief of a police station 
became the first person in Japan’s modern legal history to be formally 
indicted by a citizen’s panel, called the Prosecutorial Review Commission 
(PRC).1  Historically, until then, Japanese prosecutors had been the only 
party with the legal power and authority to issue an indictment in criminal 
cases.  This criminal negligence case, known as the Akashi Stampede 
incident, left eleven people dead and 247 people injured.  Despite 
significant public calls for the deputy chief’s prosecution, the Prosecutors 
Office made the decision numerous times not to indict the deputy chief.2 
Public dismay followed the decisions not to indict.  The Kobe 
PRC of Hyogo Prefecture, which is just west of Japan’s second largest 
city of Osaka, finally recommended the indictment of former Deputy 
Chief of the Akashi police station Kazuaki Sakaki for professional 
negligence resulting in deaths and injuries.3  The PRC’s recommendation 
was its second public demand for prosecution since the revision of the 
PRC Law took effect.  The first PRC indictment against a police officer 
was returned by the same Kobe PRC in July 2009.4 
According to the new PRC Law, the second PRC 
recommendation for prosecution is legally binding, thereby prompting the 
                                                 
1 Ex-police Officer to be Charged over Stampede in Line with New System, JAPAN ECON. 
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 27, 2010 [hereinafter Ex-police Officer] (discussing the use of the PRC to 
indict Kazuaki Sakaki and two police officers for the death of eleven people). 
2 Id.  
3‘Forced Indictment’ a Heavy Responsibility, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 29, 2010, at 2 
(agreeing with the indictment so that the facts of the tragedy may be revealed and 
determine who was at fault). 
4 Ex-police Officer, supra note 1.  
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formal criminal prosecution of a suspect, whom the Japanese prosecutor 
previously decided not to indict.5  In other words, the PRC has emerged as 
a popular legal institution with the power both to challenge critically the 
propriety of a prosecutor’s indictment decision and to reverse the 
government’s decision on certain criminal matters. 
Throughout Japan’s modern history, the government office of 
public prosecution has long held the exclusive legal power to indict.  After 
World War II, in 1948, the Allied forces led by the U.S. government tried 
to weaken the prosecutor’s dominant role in the criminal investigative and 
adjudicatory process by introducing a citizen’s panel to review the 
government’s decisions on prosecutorial matters. 6   If the prosecutor 
decided not to indict a suspect in a criminal case, the victim of the crime 
or the victim’s proxy may demand a hearing regarding the prosecutorial 
decision.  The PRC, which is composed of eleven citizens chosen at 
random from local voter registration, conducts this hearing.7  If the PRC 
decides that the indictment is the proper criminal disposition in the given 
case, it delivers a written recommendation to the Prosecutors Office.  
Since prosecutors held the exclusive authority to indict, the PRC 
recommendations were regarded as merely advisory rather than legally 
binding, and Japanese prosecutions often disregarded the 
recommendations.8 
In the Akashi Stampede incident, two separate review 
commissions recommended prosecution of the former police officer.  
Those decisions were made prior to the enactment of the new PRC Law in 
2009.  After brief investigations in both instances, the prosecutors 
dismissed the PRC recommendations and announced their non-indictment 
decisions.9  After the new PRC Law took effect in May 2009, the families 
of victims resubmitted a complaint to the local PRC which once again 
deliberated on the case.  In January 2010, its second deliberation reversed 
the previous decision not to prosecute and finally forced the prosecutors to 
begin their prosecutorial proceeding against the former police officer.10 
                                                 
5 See discussion infra Part II.B.   
6 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.  
7 Kensatsu Shinsakai Hō [Prosecutorial Review Commission Law], Law No. 147 of 1948, 
art. 4 [hereinafter PRC law].   
8 Setsuko Kamiya, Inquest Committee:  Inquest Bodies Give Public a Voice, JAPAN TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2010092lil. 
html (“Previously, their [PRC] rulings were only recommendations to prosecutors.”); 
Editorial, Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, JAPAN TIMES, May 19, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090519a1.html (“Before the law revision . . . 
public prosecutors often decided not to indict suspects after a second investigation.”). 
9 Ex-police Officer, supra note 1. 
10 Ex-police Official Indicted over Stampede Under New Inquest System, JAPAN TODAY, 
Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/ex-police-official-
indicted-over-stampede-under-new-inquest-system.  
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The refusal of the government to facilitate the prosecution of a 
select group of the privileged elites, despite their egregious conduct, has 
been well documented throughout Japan’s modern history.  Even today, 
both unethical conduct and outright illegal activities by high-ranking 
government officers are not subjected to prosecutorial scrutiny, indictment, 
or trial.  Similarly, police officers and prosecutors have not been properly 
punished for the lengthy detention of innocent civilians and the use of 
physical and psychological torture during interrogation.11 
This paper argues that the new binding power bestowed upon the 
PRC can exert a significant authority over, and insert public sentiments 
and equitable judgments into, prosecutorial decisions on politically 
sensitive cases or controversial issues that may affect the broader public 
interest.  In addition, the PRC can help expose the fortified terrain of 
special protection and immunity given by the Japanese government to 
influential political heavyweights, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business 
elites.  A single civic complaint by victims or their proxies in the PRC can 
initiate a public hearing to review incidents or alleged crimes committed 
by individuals whom the Japanese government did not indict. 
Part II of this article examines the history of the PRC, reviews its 
power to examine the propriety of the prosecutor’s non-indictment 
decision, and reveals the important civic function it performs in 
incorporating public voices into the deliberation of criminal cases.  Part III 
provides analysis of two recent PRC decisions and the patterns in their 
deliberation and decision that may influence the conduct of public officers 
and governmental bureaucrats, forcing decision-making to be more 
transparent and accountable.  These two PRC cases involved:  (1) the 
Akashi Stampede incident; and (2) the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment 
accident, both of which took place in Hyogo Prefecture in southern Japan. 
Part IV presents the results of recent surveys and interviews of 
former PRC members.  The preliminary results of these studies were first 
published in an earlier paper of mine, which conducted a cross-national 
comparison of the legal experiences of Japanese and American jurors.  
Here, to provide some empirical insight into the PRC, I summarize the 
key findings of these studies, which examined PRC former members’ 
experiences in serving on the commission, their attitudes and opinions 
towards civic legal participation, their perceptions on civic responsibilities, 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Retrial Clears Japanese Wrongly Convicted of Child Killing:  
Defendant Jailed 17 Years was Bullied to Confess, Judge Says in Acquittal, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Mar. 27, 2010, at 3 (discovering human rights violations in forced confessions in the 
criminal justice system); Tapes Show Route to ‘Confession’:  Recordings of Sugaya 
Interrogation Reveal Prosecutor’s Tactics, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 10, 2009, at 2 (having 
been placed under tremendous psychological stress and torture, the innocent suspect 
claimed, “I can’t forgive that prosecutor.  I want him to apologize.”). 
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and the weight of people’s trust and confidence in judicial institutions and 
law enforcement agencies.  My analysis of the interview and survey 
results show that the deliberative engagement and people’s direct 
participation in the decision-making process enhanced their sense of civic 
engagement and social responsibility, elevated the feeling of civic 
empowerment over governmental functions and decision-making, and 
fostered long-lasting commitment to civic engagement and future 
deliberative opportunities. 
Part V examines and proposes future strategies to promote public 
interests in criminal matters.  It provides overall summaries of the 
missions, functions, and consequences of PRC’s deliberative powers and 
explores the potential boundaries of future utilization of the PRC and its 
deliberative processes in furthering the effort to democratize the judiciary 
and to hold the government accountable and responsible to the demands of 
the public in governmental affairs. 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW 
COMMISSION AND ITS OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL 
PROSECUTION 
A. The Original Conception and Creation 
Through the joint collaborative work of the Japanese government 
and the Allied forces, represented by the U.S. government, the civilian 
review commission was established by the passage of the Prosecutorial 
Review Commission Law on July 12, 1948.12  The PRC is the Japanese 
version of an American-style grand jury system.  As the leader of the 
office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) 
occupying Japan after World War II, General Douglas McArthur saw the 
grand jury as an important democratic institution for engaging the public. 
The first suggestion to establish the grand jury system in Japan 
was included in the Proposed Revision of Code of Criminal Procedure, 
authored by Captain Maniscalco of the Legal Section, Public Safety 
Division of the SCAP.13  Article 227 of the proposed revised code of 
criminal procedure specifically stated that “no accused shall be made to 
answer (stand public action) for any crime the penalty for which may be 
                                                 
12 PRC law, supra note 7, art. 4.   
13 Anna Dobrovolskaia, Japan’s Past Experiences with the Institution of Jury Service, 49 
n.233 (Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with East Asia Law Review) 
(discussing the history of revisions of implementing both the grand and petit jury system in 
Japan).  The paper was presented at the Inaugural East Asia Law and Society Conference 
in Hong Kong in February 2010.      
6 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 6 
 
confinement for one year or more, or for life, or an indefinite period, or 
death, unless an indictment or presentment made by a grand jury.”14  
Article 228 also specified, “[n]o indictment shall be found, nor shall 
presentment be made, without the concurrence of at least ten jurors (of a 
panel of 12).”15  However, Captain Maniscalco’s proposal was submitted 
to the Japanese government as a private draft and his provision regarding 
the jury system were not formally included as part of the final draft of the 
official SCAP recommendation.16  Thomas L. Blackmore, who became 
the first non-Japanese to pass the Japanese bar examination conducted in 
Japanese and worked as Chief of Civil Affairs and Civil Liberties Branch, 
Legislation, and Justice Division, Legal Section under the SCAP, 
proposed a substantially different version of the U.S. grand jury system to 
the Japanese government.17  His deep understanding of Japanese legal 
ethos and culture was crucial to a successful negotiation with Japanese 
officials. After Blakemore graduated from the University of Oklahoma, he 
received a grant to study in Japan and came to Tokyo in 1939 as a student 
of international law and language at Tokyo Imperial University.18  After 
he passed the Japanese bar exam, he was also admitted to practice law 
with full courtroom status in Japan.19  As Blakemore was highly critical of 
Maniscalco’s original proposal and Maniscalco’s seemingly unilateral 
imposition of the American lay participatory system onto Japanese legal 
culture, his own proposal laid the foundation for the creation of the PRC 
to check the prosecution’s discretion when it decides not to prosecute.20 
With a strong American influence, the PRC became a hybrid 
institution, adapting the American civil and criminal grand jury systems to 
Japanese culture and legal milieu.  This legal system mirrored America’s 
civil grand jury because it examined and inspected local public offices, 
including the Prosecutors Office, the police department, and local jails, to 
ensure they function properly.21  Similar to the U.S. criminal grand jury, 
the PRC has influence on decisions to indict, with over 150 such 
committees throughout Japan.22  
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 50 n.240. 
17 JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER:  LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 126 
n.12 (1991). 
18 Mary F. Pols, Thomas Blakemore Spent His Life Connecting America and Japan, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at B4 (recounting Blakemore’s life and influence on Japan).  
19 HALEY, supra note 17.   
20 SHIGEMITSU DANDŌ, WAGA KOKORO NO TABIJI [JOURNEYS OF MY OWN HEART] 196-31 
(1986) (recounting his memories of the Japanese committee to revise the Japanese legal 
institutions). 
21 See generally Hiroshi Fukurai, The Proposal to Establish the System of the Federal Civil 
Grand Jury in America (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
22 Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, supra note 8.   
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 The principal function of the commission is to empanel a group 
of randomly chosen Japanese citizens to examine and review a 
prosecutor’s discretion in decisions not to indict.  Given the fact that 
nearly 100% of all indictments lead to conviction in Japan,23 the PRC’s ex 
post facto review of whether the decision not to prosecute was proper is 
quite important in checking any potential prosecutorial abuse of power. 
Since its creation in 1948, the PRC has examined many 
controversial political cases and investigated activities related to personal 
injuries, torts, and other civil matters.  Not only has the PRC deliberated 
on criminal cases, but they also have examined prominent white-collar 
crimes and allegations of egregious governmental misconduct.24  Their 
examinations have included controversial matters such as:  the Minamata 
mercury poisoning incidents,25 an organ transplant from a brain dead 
donor,26 thalidomide scandals,27 incidents where hemophiliacs contracted 
HIV from contaminated blood products, 28  drug-induced sufferings of 
millions of Japanese who contracted the Hepatitis C virus from unheated 
                                                 
23 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Conviction Rate so 
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001) (“Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent.”). 
24  See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems: 
A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experience 
in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 349-353 (2007) (discussing how 
Japan’s HIV contamination incident is historically rooted in the germ and biological 
warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731 military doctors during WWII, who later 
played prominent roles in the development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industries and the 
formulation of health-related government policies).      
25 See generally T. TSUBAKI & K. IRUKAYAMA, MINAMATA DISEASE:  METHYLMERCURY 
POISONING IN MINAMATA AND NIIGATA, JAPAN (1977) (explaining that Minamata disease 
was originally caused by the release of methylmercury in the industrial wastewater from 
the Chisso Corporation’s chemical factory from 1932 to 1968 and that local prefectural 
and central governments did little to prevent the pollution, further exacerbating the 
problem); Ass’n of Minamata Disease Victims “Shiranui” & Minamata Disease Victims’ 
Mutual Aid Soc’y, Statement by Minamata Victims and Supporter Groups Addressing the 
Government of Japan’s Proposal to Call the Mercury Treaty the “Minamata Convention” 
(Jan. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/ 
kagaku/pico/mercury/INC2_NGO/Minamata_Statement_110123_en.pdf (“The Supreme 
Court verdict of October 2004 established the legal responsibility of the Government of 
Japan and Kumamoto prefecture for spreading Minamata disease.”);   
Kensatsu shinsakai no gaiyō [Overview of the Prosecutorial Review Commission], 
SAIBANSHO [COURTS IN JAPAN] (2005), http://www.courts.go.jp/kensin/seido/ 
sinsakai.html.  
26 Fuin sareta misshitsu no giwaku:  Wada kyōju no shinzō ishoku jiken [Questions Behind 
Closed Doors:  The Heart Transplant by Professor Wada], KI NI NARU SHIRYŌ-SHITSU 
(2005), http://www.nazoo.org/misteries/wada.htm. 
27 Katsuhiko Komatsu, Toriatsukai shinsa jikensū to yūmei jiken [Numbers of PRC 
Deliberations and Famous Cases], http://www.macnet.or.jp/co/ok21/kensatsu5.html (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
28 Summaries of the Prosecutorial Review Commission, supra note 25. 
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pharmaceutical products previously approved by the government,29 and 
illegal campaign donations and political bribery.30 
The PRC investigates these cases from behind closed doors.  They 
have the power to summon petitioners, their proxies, and witnesses for 
examination, question prosecutors, ask them for additional information 
when necessary, and seek special expert advice on a given case.31  The 
investigative function only begins after a public complaint filed against a 
decision by the prosecution not to indict.  Individuals and civic 
organizations are empowered to file these complaints to launch a first 
strike against the prosecution in its assessment of criminal matters. 
After assessing and deliberating on the case, the PRC then 
submits one of three recommendations:  (1) the non-indictment is proper; 
(2) the non-indictment is improper; or (3) the indictment is proper.  A 
simple majority is needed for either of the first two resolutions, while a 
supermajority of at least eight of the eleven votes is needed to pass the 
third resolution.  The PRC then delivers a written recommendation to the 
Prosecutors Office.  In the past, because the Prosecutors Office was the 
only institution with the power to indict, the PRC’s recommendations 
were regarded as advisory.  This limited legal authority was finally 
expanded by the 2004 PRC Act, which made PRC decisions legally 
binding.32 
Nonetheless, the importance of civic participation in the legal 
system and PRC has not been widely communicated to Japanese 
communities, suggesting that PRC duties remain virtually unknown in 
Japan.  For example, in a 1990 national poll by the Japanese Cabinet 
Office, 68.8% of respondents had no knowledge of the PRC system or its 
duties.33  Even among those with knowledge of the system, 73.8% of them 
did not know who could actually be selected to sit on the commission.34  
In addition to its obscurity, strict confidentiality requirements and severe 
penalties imposed on PRC participants may further discourage, and even 
scare away, many people from fulfilling their PRC duties. 
B. The 2004 PRC Act and the New Legally Binding 
Authority 
                                                 
29 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 349-53. 
30 Id. at 347-49. 
31 Keiji soshōhōtō no ichibu o kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Revise the Code of Criminal 
Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 38, available at http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html [hereinafter PRC Act]. 
32 Id. art. 41(6)(1). 
33 Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu [Cabinet Office, Public Relations], Kensatsu shinsakai seido 
ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Public Opinion Poll on the PRC System], Oct. 1990, available at 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h02/H02-10-02-15.html.   
34 Id. 
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For many decades, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations 
(JFBA) insisted that the PRC decision be given legally binding status, 
instead of being treated as a mere advisement to the Japanese prosecutor.  
In 1973, the JFBA created the internal investigative commission to 
examine whether or not the PRC resolution should receive legally binding 
authority.35  After two years of analysis and examination, the investigative 
committee submitted the recommendation to the headquarters of the JFBA, 
which then released its final report in 1975. 36   The final report 
recommended that the second PRC decision to indict must be legally 
binding.  Specifically, the report recommended that first, after the PRC 
decides that “the indictment was proper” or “the non-indictment was 
improper,” the prosecutor is required to decide whether to maintain their 
decision not to prosecute and respond to the PRC recommendation within 
the three months.  If the decision not to prosecute stands, the prosecutor 
has to provide an explanation of their non-indictment decision to the 
PRC.37  If the PRC is not convinced by the prosecutor’s explanation and 
believes that the indictment was proper for the given case, its second 
decision to indict is then binding.38  Prosecutors are then required to 
respect the PRC decision and initiate a public action against the accused. 
The JFBA report also recommended that a two-thirds majority 
approve the second resolution.  The report suggested a new structure for 
the PRC and the replacement of the quota system with a quorum rule.  
Under the existing PRC law, the deliberative forum had to consist of 
eleven members.  Often times, however, the forum did not meet its 
required quota for attendance because PRC members had work-related 
hardships, economic excuses, or other personal reasons.  The JFBA report, 
thus, recommended that the number of PRC members be expanded from 
eleven to fifteen and that the PRC adopt a quorum rule so that the 
attendance of any eleven members would constitute a quorum for full 
deliberative discussions.39   
The JFBA report recommended that two PRC decisions—“the 
indictment is proper” and “the non-indictment is improper”—share 
essentially the same legal status, and the passage of this first PRC 
indictment decision requires a two-thirds vote (i.e., at least eight of eleven 
votes).  A second decision of “the indictment is proper,” requires a two-
thirds majority of the entire fifteen members, which means that at least ten 
                                                 
35 JAPANESE FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCATIONS, KENSATSU SHINSAKAI SEIDO NO KAISEIAN:  
SONO JŪJITSU KYŌKA WO MEZASHITE [THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL 
REVIEW COMMISSION:  TO ENRICH AND STRENGTHEN] (1975). 
36 Id. at 1. 
37 Id. at 28-29. 
38 Id. at 29. 
39 Id. at 16-17. 
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votes are necessary for a legally binding indictment.40  The JFBA’s 
proposals, however, were not made into law and its recommendations to 
strengthen the PRC had to wait another twenty years for serious 
discussion.  The opportunity to revisit and possibly incorporate the JFBA 
recommendations finally came in the late 1990s, when the Justice System 
Reform Council (JSRC) discussed the introduction of another lay justice 
institution, the lay assessor system. 
The revision of the PRC law, however, was not a primary 
objective of the JSRC’s discussions and was only first mentioned in 
JSRC’s seventh meeting in November 1999.41  It took until April 10, 2001 
for discussion on the revision of the PRC law to emerge.  The JSRC, the 
JFBA, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Justice expressed differing 
strategies and opinions.  JSRC members discussed making the two 
resolutions— “non-indictment is improper” and “indictment is proper”—
legally binding.42  At the same time, the Ministry of Justice recommended 
that only the third resolution of “indictment is proper” should be legally 
binding, while  the Supreme Court suggested the second resolution, “non-
indictment is improper,” be binding when the decision is unanimous.  
Finally, the JFBA’s view was that the third resolution should be legally 
binding and subject to a two-thirds voting requirement and that PRC 
members should be supported in their deliberations by a practicing 
attorney.43 
Although the final JSRC proposal lacked specificity regarding 
revision of the PRC law, a close reading of the proposal reveals a 
commitment to introducing a legal system that “reflect[s] popular will 
more directly,” 44  that “grants legally binding effect to certain 
resolutions,”45 and that would “enable the voices of people to be heard and 
                                                 
40 Id. at 18-19. 
41 Shihōseido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 7 kai giji gaiyō [JSRC:  No. 7 Proceeding Outline] 
(Nov. 24 1999), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/ 
991126dai7.html. 
42 Shihōseido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 55 kai giji gaiyō [JSRC:  No. 55 Proceeding Outline] 
(Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55gaiyou.html. 
43 Kensatsu shinsakai no itteino giketsu ni taishi hōteki kōsokuryoku o fuyōsuru tameno 
hōsaku: Hōsō sansha no iken no hikaku [The Strategy to Provide a Legally Mandatory 
Status to a Particular Resolution by the PRC:  Comparisons of Three Legal Professional 
Groups] (Apr. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55bessi2.html [hereinafter Strategy]. 
44 Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council–For a Justice System to 
Support Japan in the 21st Century, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (translating portions 
of Kokumin no kitai ni kotaeru shihō seido [The Judicial System in Response to 
Expectation of Citizens] (June 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report/ikensyo/iken-2.html). 
45 Id. 
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reflected in the management of the public prosecutors offices.”46  The Lay 
Assessor/Penal Matter Investigation Committee was authorized to 
undertake the establishment of the lay assessor system and the revision of 
the PRC law.  The Chairman of the Committee presented an outline, 
suggesting that the PRC’s decision be legally binding and that a practicing 
attorney be included as a legal advisor.47  Public opinion and feedback on 
the Committee’s proposals and guidelines were solicited in April and May 
2003.48  Many grassroots activists from the Research Group on Jury Trial 
(RGJT) were encouraged to send their opinions and suggestions to the 
committee website.49  As a result of greater calls for participation and 
involvement, there was substantial public response.  Individual citizens 
complained about the failure to recruit a sufficient number of lay 
participants for the commission to convene50 and the PRC’s automatic 
disqualification of vision or hearing impaired candidates. 51   The 
institutional response was strong as well.  The JFBA and the Citizens 
Committee for the Creation of a Lay Assessor System, an influential civic 
group, opposed and criticized the imposition of a penalty on PRC 
members for divulging case-specific information, but both strongly 
supported the PRC resolution to be legally binding.52  A final proposal 
was submitted and the PRC Law was revised on May 28, 2004.53 
The back-and-forth maneuvers finally resulted in revision to the 
PRC law, giving a PRC resolution the legally binding authority to demand 
explanations for non-prosecution decisions and making explanations 
mandatory if the commission recommended prosecution two times.  
Specifically, the revised law created a two-step process to make a PRC 
                                                 
46 Id. (suggesting the need to reinforce the PRC system by expanding the volunteer officer 
system).  
47 Chairman Inouye submitted his outline for reform on November 11, 2003.  
Kangaerareru Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido Kaisei no Gaiyo ni Tsuite [The Outline on the 
PRC’s Reform to Consider] (Nov. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai29/29siryou1.pdf.   
48 OFFICE FOR THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE SYS. REFORM, Saiban-in Seido oyobi Kensatsu 
Shinsakai Seido ni Tsuiteno Ikenboshu no Kekka ni tsuite [Results of Public Opinions on 
the Lay Assessor and PRC Systems] (July 2003), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/siryou/0307kekka.html. 
49 The RGJT has a long history of advocating for the establishment of the jury system in 
Japan.  See Fukurai, supra note 24, at 317-20 (“The RGJT became the national center for 
providing resources and jury information and organized many public forums to discuss the 
introduction of the jury trial in Japan.”). 
50Id. at 327 (citing Saiban-in seido oyobi kensatsu shinsakai ni tsuiteno iken boshu no 
kekka gaiyo [Resulting outlines of public opinions on the lay assessor and PRC systems] 9 
(July 2003), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/22siryou1.pdf ).   
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 PRC Act, supra note 31. 
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resolution legally binding.  When prosecutors issue a decision not to indict 
in a given case and the PRC decides that indictment is in fact proper, 
prosecutors are obliged to reconsider their non-indictment decision.  If 
prosecutors decide for a second time not to prosecute, or if they do not 
indict within three months, the prosecutors will be asked to explain their 
inaction or non-indictment decision to the commission.54  The PRC will 
then reconsider the case and if it makes a decision to indict, this decision 
becomes legally binding.55  The court appoints a lawyer to perform the 
prosecution’s role until a ruling is reached,56 but the actual instruction to 
investigate authorities will be entrusted to prosecutors.57    
Under the revision to the PRC Law, a practicing attorney is 
appointed as a “legal advisor” when the PRC decides that legal knowledge 
and advice is necessary.58  This is particularly relevant to the second step 
of the process, when the commission may reevaluate the prosecutors’ 
second decision not to indict.59  
C. The PRC Selection Procedure 
The new PRC Act tries to ensure active discussion among local 
residents selected for PRC duty by providing the procedural means and 
selection mechanisms to achieve a broader and cross-sectional 
representation of the population.  While the PRC selection procedure is 
quite similar to the lay assessor selection process, the electoral 
commission initiates the latter procedure.  For PRC selection, the 
Prosecutorial Review Commission Office (PRCO), a governmental 
administrative office, is responsible for the selection of PRC members.  
First, the new PRC Act specifies that the director of PRCO shall 
determine an approximate number of PRC members needed for the next 
year, as well as a specific allocation of prospective PRC members to be 
selected from each village, town, and city within the court’s jurisdiction.60  
At the second selection stage, each allocation of PRC members is reported 
to relevant local electoral administrative commissions. 61   Prospective 
members are divided into four different reserve pools, each consisting of 
at least one hundred prospective jurors.62  At this stage, based on the 
                                                 
54 Id. arts. 41(2)(2), 41(6)(2). 
55 Id. art. 41(6)(1). 
56 Id. art. 41(9)(1). 
57 Id. art. 41(9)(3). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. art. 41(4) (requiring by law that the PRC has assistance of a legal advisor when 
considering the second resolution of the same case). 
60 Id. art. 9(1).  
61 Id. 
62 Id. art. 9(2). 
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number of prospective PRC members for each geographical unit, the 
election administrative commission selects PRC candidates from their 
electoral register, creating “the Proposed List of PRC Candidates,” and 
sends this list to the PRCO.63 
 Similar to the lay assessor selection procedure, once the proposed 
list is created, the deceased, people with felony convictions, and residents 
who do not meet the qualifications are filtered out.64   The selected 
candidates are contacted by the election administrative commission and 
screened for their qualifications.65 
The election administrative commission then selects a necessary number 
of qualified candidates and places them in each of four PRC reserves via 
lottery.66  The specific date and place of random selection for PRC 
candidates must be conducted in the presence of a district judge and a 
prosecutor.67 
 Detailed procedures are required for a fair selection of PRC 
members.  Each PRC member must serve a term of six months.  While lay 
assessors serve for an individual case, PRC members must continue to 
serve on the commission for a half-year, with about one-fourth of the 
eleven members being replaced every three months.  In the actual 
selection of PRC members, the director of the PRCO randomly selects 
five jury candidates from the first reserve by December 28th, six jury 
candidates from the second reserve by March 31st, five candidates from 
the third reserve by June 30th, and six candidates from the fourth reserve 
by September 30th of each year.68 
 Once PRC members appear at the courthouse, the chief justice of 
the court or the superior court judge instructs them about their duties and 
administers an oath.69  A PRC foreperson is then appointed to lead the 
deliberation.70  The PRC foreperson is similar to that of an American jury.  
This differs from a lay assessor trial, which according to the Lay Assessor 
Act does not require a deliberative leader among the lay judges, the 
professional judge is assumed to take on the leadership role in deliberative 
discussions.71 
                                                 
63 Id. art. 10(1)(2)(3). 
64 Id. art.12(1). 
65 Id. art. 12(4). 
66 Id. art. 13(1). 
67 Id. art. 13(2). 
68 Id. art. 13(1). 
69 Id. art. 16(1)(2)(3)(4). 
70 Id. art. 15(1). 
71 See Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning the 
participation of law assessors in criminal trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 [hereinafter the Lay 
Assessor Act].  Saiban-in seido is translated as “the lay assessor” or “the quasi-jury” 
system.  See Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law:  An 
Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal 
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Despite some notable procedural and logistical differences 
between the lay assessor and PRC selection procedures, there are also 
similarities.  Both systems exclude and disqualify politicians, elected 
officials, and those who perform vital political and criminal justice 
functions from participating.  Prior to the appearance of potential 
candidates at the courthouse, both selection procedures share similar 
selection steps and logistical requirements for the creation of candidate 
lists.   Nonetheless, the major and significant difference lies in the fact that 
the PRC selection does not have an equivalent to voir dire.  Another 
difference is that the lay assessor selection primarily relies on the district 
court to administer various procedural tasks during selection.  The PRC 
selection procedure is administered by PRCO.  PRCO provides direct or 
indirect assistance in the procedural steps throughout the whole process to 
select the final group of PRC members and its foreperson. 
Given the lengthy commitment of PRC duty and the rigorous 
selection procedures governing the preparation of the PRC candidate list 
and qualified pool, the composition of PRC members may not represent 
an accurate cross-section of the community.  Jury research in the United 
States has found significant representative disparities and social inequities 
among American grand jurors on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
social class.72  In Japan, a preliminary study has found that Japanese PRC 
members were more likely to be male and in their 40s and 50s.73  While 
there is no known study that examines the demographics of PRC members, 
there may be concerns about the underrepresentation of Japan’s ethnic 
minorities such as Burakumins (Japan’s so called untouchables), Ainus, 
Koreans, Chinese, Brazilian, and other immigrant groups from Southeast 
Asia and the Middle East.74  As the same ethnic groups make up a rather 
sizable segment of criminal defendants, it may be important to research 
ethnic makeup and explore ethnic diversity of PRC membership.  
The schematic diagram of the eight stages of PRC selection is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
------------ 
Figure 1  
                                                                                                               
Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233-35 (2004) (overviewing and then translating 
the Lay Assessor Act).   
72 See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX:  
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (State Univ. of N.Y. Press, 2003). 
73 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 334-36 (summarizing the research on civic participation in 
Japan). 
74 See generally SHEFFIELD CTR. FOR JAPANESE STUDIES, JAPAN’S MINORITIES:  THE 
ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY vii (Michael Weiner ed., 2d. ed., 2009) (seeking, in part, to 
evaluate the construction of the Japanese identity and the life of minorities in 
contemporary Japan). 
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III. THE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE 
JAPANESE PROSECUTION 
 
The Japanese prosecutors were once given the exclusive power to 
issue an indictment against a suspect.  The 2004 PRC Act has changed the 
prosecutor’s role and has empowered the civic panel with rights to indict 
suspected criminals. 
 The following two criminal cases received national attention 
because both incidents led to the deaths and injuries of hundreds of 
civilians, including children and women.  The civic complaints were 
submitted to the local PRCs to review the decision not to indict a group of 
individuals who were allegedly responsible for the accidents.  In one of 
the cases, despite multiple decisions by local prosecutors not to indict and 
repeated requests by victims’ families to review the propriety of the 
prosecutors’ decisions, the PRC’s decision reversed the prosecutors and 
led to the forced indictment of a deputy chief police officer. 
A. The Asahi Stampede Incident75 
The 2010 PRC decision on the Asahi Stampede Incident set an 
important precedent in Japan’s legal history.  Until then, Japanese 
prosecutors had routinely paid little attention to, if not ignored, the PRC’s 
resolutions.  The 2004 PRC Act changed the power matrix of the 
relationship between the prosecution and the PRC. 
 In 2010, the PRC in Hyogo Prefecture recommended the 
prosecution of the Deputy Chief Officer of the Akashi police station for 
the injuries of 247 people and the death of eleven people, including nine 
children, who were crushed to death in the stampede incident in Akashi 
City in Hyogo Prefecture.  Hyogo Prefecture has a total of five PRCs in its 
jurisdiction:  (1) the First Kobe PRC, (2) the Second Kobe PRC, (3) Itami 
PRC, (4) Himeji PRC, and (5) Toyooka PRC.76  The decision of the 
                                                 
75 In an earlier paper, I provided an account of this incident prior to the enactment of the 
new PRC law.  Fukurai, supra note 24, at 345-47.  In this Part, I summarize the 
background facts as presented in my past paper and then describe the many developments 
that have taken place since the enactment of the new PRC law.    
76 Zenkoku no kensatsu shinsakai ichiran-hyō [List of All Prosecutorial Review 
Commissions in Japan], SAIBANSHO [COURTS IN JAPAN], http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
kensin/seido/itiran.html (last visited on Apr. 24, 2010),. 
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Second Kobe PRC after it deliberated on the Akashi incident forced the 
Japanese prosecution to formally bring action against the police officer. 
This deadly accident happened on July 21, 2001, when 130,000 
people attended a fireworks display organized by the Akashi Municipal 
government.  After 8:30 p.m., the stampede occurred on a narrow 
pedestrian bridge, which connects a train station and the shoreline where 
the fireworks display took place.  The incident was blamed on youths who 
allegedly caused overcrowding because they had sat and watched 
fireworks on the bridge.77  However, a report by the municipality revealed 
that those youths actually helped rescue victims of the incident by calling 
for help and moving the crowd and children to safety.78  The same report 
also found the local police, the city government, and a security firm 
jointly responsible for the incident because they were forewarned of a risk 
of stampede when during a millennium celebration in December 2000, 
nearly 3,000 people surged onto the same bridge.79  Finally, the report 
faulted the Akashi police for failing to take any precautionary measures on 
the bridge.80  Nevertheless, in December 2002, the Prosecutors Office did 
not indict the heads of the Akashi police.  Families of the victims 
promptly filed an appeal of the non-indictment decision, and in April 2004, 
the PRC issued an “indictment is proper” resolution, finding that two 
officers failed to devise and implement precautionary measures, which 
would have prevented the incident.81   
Prosecutors still refused to indict and the families of victims 
requested review of the second non-indictment decision.  In December 
2005, the PRC delivered another "indictment is proper" resolution, which 
the prosecutors dismissed yet again six months later.82  The families of 
victims announced in November 2006 that they would file a third appeal 
of the prosecutor's non-indictment decision once the new PRC law is 
enacted and a PRC’s decision can be made legally binding.83 
                                                 
77 Youth Suspected in Akashi Fireworks Fatal Stampede, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, July 23, 
2001 (reporting the police attributed the stampede to the youth). 
78 Akashi hodōkyō jiko: Gokaisareta yaneno ueno shinjitsu [The Akashi Pedestrian Bridge 
Accident: The Misunderstood 'Above the Roof' Truth], KOBE SHIMBUN, Aug. 5, 2001. 
79 Panel Finds City, Police at Fault in Fireworks Stampede, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 
30, 2002; Hodōkyō jiko: Akashishiga hōtekisekinin hajimete meiji [Pedestrian Accident: 
The City of Akashi Recognizes Its Culpability for the First Time], KOBE SHIMBUN, Feb. 11, 
2002, http://www.kobe-np.co.jp/backnumber/ 
asagiri/0003520294.shtml. 
80 Paper Sent on 12 in Overpass Disaster, DAILY YOMIURI, May 10, 2002. 
81 Indictment of Cops Urged in Bridge Deaths, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 24, 2004. 
82 Prosecutors Again Refuse to Indict Cops over Crush, DAILY YOMIURI, June 26, 2006. 
83 Moto shochōra 3 dome no kiso mōshitate he [The Third Motion to be Filed to Prosecute 
the Former Chief], KOBE SHIMBUN, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.kobe-
np.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520186.shtml. 
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On May 21, 2009, the day that new PRC law went into effect, the 
families filed another appeal of the non-indictment decision and the PRC 
determined, on July 30, that “indictment is proper” for the third time.84  As 
the Chief of the Akashi police station died in July 2007, the PRC’s 
indictment decision only covered the prosecution of the former Deputy 
Chief.  The prosecutor decided, once again, after another brief 
investigation, not to indict the officer in October.85   
The victims of the Akashi incident filed the petition again, and on 
December 7th, the PRC began to deliberate on the fourth non-indictment 
decision by the prosecutors.86  The petitioner’s claim also included a 
specific request for the victims to voice their opinions and issues on the 
case.87  On January 8, 2010, as required by the new PRC law in cases of 
disagreement with the PRC’s indictment decision, the Kobe Prosecutor’s 
Office provided their explanation of the fourth non-indictment decision, as 
well as their professional opinions and current position on the criminal 
case.88   
On January 27, 2010, after many years of review, the Kobe PRC 
finally issued the second recommendation of prosecution against the 
deputy officer, thereby reversing a series of previous non-indictment 
decisions by the prosecutor.89  Specifically, the PRC’s recommendation 
stated that former Deputy Chief of Police Kazuaki Sakaki should be 
charged with professional negligence resulting in death and injury by 
failing to prevent a fatal stampede.90  The Kobe PRC decision also became 
the first case of automatic indictment since the revised PRC law came into 
force.  The three defense lawyers were appointed by the court to take on 
                                                 
84 Moto fukushochō 3 dome no kiso sōtō giketsu kensatsushin [The Third Time Resolution 
for the Indictment is Proper for Deputy Police Officer by the Prosecutorial Review 
Commission], KOBE SHIMBUN, July 30, 2009, http://www.kobe-
np.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520188.shtml. 
85 Akashi hodōkyō jiko 4 dome fukiso:  shimin kankaku mushi [Non-Prosecution Decision 
for the Fourth Time Against the Former Deputy Officer of the Akashi Police: Civic 
Common Sense Ignored], KOBE SHIMBUN, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.kobe-
np.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520221.shtml. 
86 Akashi hodōkyō jiko, kensatsu shinsakai ga saishinsa kaishi [On the Akashi Pedestrian 
Bridge Case, PRC Began to Deliberate], KŌMUIN NO FUSHŌJI [PUBLIC OFFICER’S 
SCANDALS] (Dec. 7, 2009, 11:29PM), http://cat.cscblog.jp/content/ 
0000953005.html. 
87 Id. 
88 Akashi hodōkyō jiko towa:  Jiko wo meguru keika (2010 nen 1 gatsu) [On the Akashi 
Pedestrian Bridge Case:  The Incident’s Legal Process in January 2010], JIJICOM (Jan. 27, 
2010), http://www.jiji.com/jc/v?p=ve_soc_jiko-akashi-kisogiketu20100127at53b. 
89 Akashi hodōkyō jiko: Naze koredake jikanga kakattanoka – Izoku kaiken [Akashi 
Pedestrian Incidents:  Why Did It Take This Long? – Testimony of Victims’ Families], 
SANKEI NEWS, Jan. 27, 2010. 
90 Id. 
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the role of prosecutors, initiate the criminal proceeding, and begin the 
formal prosecution of the officer.91 
B. The Fukuchisen Derailment Incident 
Another explosive case about the disagreement of prosecutorial 
decisions and the PRC’s deliberative outcome is the 2005 train derailment 
that killed 107 people and injured 555 others.  Like the Akashi pedestrian 
stampede accident, this massive victimization of civilians also took place 
in Hyogo Prefecture.  On April 25, 2005, a train on the West Japan 
Railway (JR West) Fukuchiyama Line derailed.  Five of the seven cars 
derailed, and both the first and second cars slammed into an apartment 
building near the tracks.  The first car crashed into a multi-story parking 
garage in the ground floor of the apartment and was compacted to half its 
original length, while the second car rammed into the building wall and 
was fractured into an L shape.92 
This was the most serious railway accident since the 1963 
Yokohama rail crash, which killed 161 and injured 120 passengers.93  The 
2005 accident occurred when the Fukuchiyama Line train took a tight 
curve at excessive speed and slammed into a high-rise residential complex.  
The First Kobe PRC determined that the major factor in the accident was 
the company’s management policy that made profits, not the safety of its 
customers, the firm’s top priority.”94 
On July 8, 2009, the prosecutors indicted the JR West President 
Masao Yamazaki after concluding that the tragedy could have been 
prevented if the curve had the Automatic Train Stop (ATS) system, which 
is used to halt trains. He was indicted for professional negligence resulting 
in deaths and injuries.95  Yamazaki also made the announcement, on the 
same day of his indictment, that he would resign his post, although he still 
remained on the JR West’s Board of Directors.   
                                                 
91 Akashi hodōkyō jiko:  Shitei bengoshi ga kensatu kanyaku – Muzukashii kōhanka 
[Akashi Pedestrian Incidents: Court Appointed Lawyers as Prosecutors – Difficult Court 
Proceeding Ahead], SANKEI NEWS, Jan. 27, 2010. 
92 Death Toll from Crash May Top 100, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20050428a2.html; Train crash kills 71, injuries 
441, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20050426a1.html; Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Unions, Statement on 
the Train-Derailed Accident on JR West Co.’s Fukuchiyama Line (Apr. 26, 2005), 
http://www.jru7.net/statement/2005/0426_accident.htm.  
93 Kokutetsu tsurumi jiko [Japan Railway Tsurumi Accident], SHŌWA NO NYŪSU [NEWS IN 
THE SHOWA ERA], Nov. 9, 1963, http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1963/ 
11/post-2e9b.html. 
94 JR West’s Actions Show Lack of Remorse, Resolve, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 24, 2009, at 4. 
95 JR West President Indicted Over Crash, JAPAN TIMES, July 9, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090709a1.html. 
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The prosecutors also decided not to bring charges against eight 
former JR West executives in charge of safety measures, three former 
managers and the 23-year-old driver who was killed in the wreck.96  In 
August, families of victims submitted a complaint to the PRC, indicating 
that two former JR West presidents also be indicted because of their 
collateral failure to install an advanced version of the ATS system at the 
site.97  On October 22, the Kobe PRC decided that three past presidents of 
the JR West be indicted and submitted their recommendation to the Kobe 
Prosecutor’s Office. 98  On December 4, after investigative work on the 
case, the Kobe prosecutors announced that they would not indict the three 
former presidents, indicating that they had no direct responsibility of 
instituting an advanced version of the ATS system at the curb of the 
derailment.99   
Meanwhile, long before a draft of the final report on the causes of 
the accident was released, JR West executives were found to have been 
given information relating to the derailment from the government’s 
Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission.100  The report 
by a third-party investigative body on the information leak revealed that 
JR West had been concerned with how it could convince the commission 
and the victims’ families of its view that the accident was not 
foreseeable.101   The investigative report also indicated, “there was a 
corporate culture that prioritized protection of the company’s interests 
over those of the accident victims as well as public sentiment.”102 
In January, victims’ families filed a complaint to the prosecutors’ 
non-indictment decisions against the three JR West presidents.103  On 
January 19, 2010, against two former transportation managers, the Kobe 
PRC decided the “the non-indictment is improper” decision and sent the 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Amagasaki Crash Kin Push for Charges, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090822a5.html. 
98 Crash Inquest Panel:  Indict Ex-JR West Heads, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091023a1.html. 
99 JR nishi no rekidai 3 shachō wo futatabi fukisoni, Takarazukasen de Kōbe hiken [Non-
Indictment Again for Three Past JR West Presidents, on the Takarazuka Derailment 
Incident, by the Kobe Prosecutors], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 5, 2009, 
http://www.asahi.com/kansai/travel/news/OSK200912050058.html. 
100 Info Leak Report Criticize JR West, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 19, 2009, at 1. 
101 Id. 
102 Yoko Inoue & Ken Iguchi, Report Slams JR West’s Corporate Culture, DAILY YOMIURI, 
Nov. 20, 2009, at 3. 
103 Fukuchiyamasen sassenjiko: Kensatsu shinsakai izoku kara iken chōshu [Fukuchiyama 
Derailment Accident:  The PRC Listens to Victims’ Families]. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 25, 
2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/ 
20100225k0000e040043000c.html [hereinafter Fukuchiyamasen].  
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recommendation to the prosecutors.104  Against three former JR West past 
presidents, the PRC summoned the families of victims and solicited their 
opinions on the case.105  The prosecutors were also summoned to explain 
the PRC decisions based on their own investigation on the case.106   
On March 26, the First Kobe PRC decided for the second time 
that the three former JR West presidents be indicted for professional 
negligence resulting in injury and death.107  On April 23, three court-
appointed lawyers formally filed charges against the three presidents for 
their failure to take railway safety measures, thereby causing the fatal train 
derailment.108 
The PRC has thus served as an important civic watchdog of the 
Japanese government and has critically reviewed its exercise of discretion 
in decisions not to indict the accused, including powerful government 
officials, political heavyweights, and economic elites.  How do lay 
participants view their civic duties and responsibilities in examining 
highly publicized cases such as the Akashi Stampede incident and 
Fukuchiyama-Line derailment case?  Were they overwhelmed by the civic 
responsibility or able to meet the challenges of fair and equitable decision 
making?  What does lay participation mean to ordinary citizens who take 
part in deliberations of politically contested and highly publicized cases?   
The next section examines the legal consciousness of ordinary 
citizens by summarizing the results of recent surveys and interviews with 
former PRC members.  These studies explore whether or not lay 
participation in legal decision making has influenced their sense of civic 
responsibility, their confidence in deliberative discussions with fellow 
members, and general perceptions and attitudes about the court, the 
prosecutors, and the police, as well as their own abilities to render just and 
equitable decisions.   
                                                 
104 Moto unyu buchō fukiso wa futō [Improper Non-Prosecution for Former 
Transportation Managers], Jichi Tsushin, January 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201001/2010012900757. 
105 Fukuchiyamasen, supra note 103. 
106 Id. 
107 Fukuchiyama-sen jiko: JR nishi rekidai 3 shachō no kisogiketsu:  Kōbe daiichi kensatsu 
[Fukuchiyama-Line Derailment Incident:  Kobe PRC Decides on Indictment Against Three 
JR-West Presidents], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 26, 2010. 
108 JR nishi no rekidai 3 shachō wo kyōsei kiso [Forced Indictments Against Three JR West 
Presidents], SANKEI NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010. 
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IV. LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW 
COMMISSION:  EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Since its inception in 1948, more than half million Japanese 
citizens have participated in PRC service. 109   A large number of 
participants have engaged in deliberative discussions for more than six 
decades; however, did PRC participants feel comfortable with their civic 
duties and responsibilities?  Did the experience encourage them to 
participate in other civic duties and influence their opinions and attitudes 
about the criminal court and justice systems?  Or more simply, did they 
enjoy their experience?  The following section summarizes the analytic 
results of Japanese respondents with regard to their experiences of civic 
legal participation in the PRC.  Preliminary data and results were first 
published in an earlier study of mine that conducted a cross-national 
comparison of the legal experiences of Japanese and American jurors.110  
Any numerical discrepancies between this Part and my previous study are 
slight and as a result of updated statistical analysis.   
 
A. The 2005–2006 PRC Survey 
 
The survey and interview data was collected with the assistance of 
the Prosecutorial Review Commission Society.111  Two hundred twenty-
nine members in 11 prefectural and regional offices filled out a survey 
questionnaire, and follow-up interviews were conducted with those 
members who were willing to do so by either telephone or in an informal 
personal setting.112  A total of 137 respondents said that they reviewed and 
examined actual cases and participated in deliberations. 113   The 
                                                 
109 Overview of the Prosecutorial Review Commission, supra note 25.   
110 For detailed information on the methodology and analysis used to generate the results 
discussed in this Part, see Fukurai, supra note 24, at 333-44.    
111 Id. The Prosecutorial Review Commission Society was established in 1955 to promote 
popular legal participation and publicize the importance of its duty in Japan.  Currently 
many regional branch offices exist all over Japan.  While more than half a milliion people 
have served on review commissions, not everyone automatically becomes a member of the 
society.  The active conduct of business of the society is only supported by members’ 
volunteer work.  There are variations as to the extent of activities and member recruitments 
among regional branches.   When the JFBA asked the society members to respond to a 
survey questionnaire in 2000 in one of the largest surveys ever conducted on popular legal 
participation, 2,315 members completed the questionnaire.  See JAPANESE FEDERATION OF 
BAR ASSOCIATIONS, Kensatsu shinsa kyōkaiin ni taisuru ankēto kekka hōkokusho [The 
Final Reports of the Results of JFBA Survey] (2000).  
112 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 334.   
113 Id. 
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respondents answered almost seventy questions, pertaining to a variety of 
topics including their willingness to participate, perceived obstacles to 
legal participation, confidence in civilian legal participation and in jurors’ 
abilities, and fear of retaliation due to service.114  Respondents answered 
theses questions with a score of 1 to 5 based on the extent of their 
agreement (i.e., “1” represents strongly agree and “5” represents strongly 
disagree”), but were also given the opportunity to express general views 
on their legal participation and PRC service.115   
 The survey revealed that the majority of PRC respondents were in 
their 60s and 70s, reflecting the age of the PRC Society’s members, and 
that the majority of PRC members served in their 40s and 50s.116  Also, 
many respondents have been in the PRC Society for a long time, 
averaging over 20 years.117  Over 70% of respondents expressed support 
for the introduction of the all-citizen jury system in Japan.118   One 
interesting finding from my previous study is that the respondents who 
served in the Japanese grand jury share similar age and economic profiles 
with American jurors.119   
B. Deliberative Experiences 
 In terms of deliberative experiences, all the responses tended to 
reflect a positive attitude and enthusiastic opinion about lay participation, 
regardless of whether the PRC members were presented with deliberative 
opportunities to review and generate recommendations for actual cases.  
Yet, PRC respondents who actually participated in case deliberations 
tended to feel that their experiences were more positive.120  A majority of 
respondents with deliberative experience (76.3%) expressed willingness to 
serve on a committee in the future.  The difference between PRC members 
with and without deliberative experience was statistically significant, 
suggesting that those with deliberative experiences are more willing to 
serve again than those without experience.  Despite this ex post positive 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 336.   
117 Id. (“Many have been in the PRC Society for a long time–members who served in their 
20s have been in the Society for an average of 31.3 years, and those who served in their 
30s and 40s (45.4% of the respondents) for an average of 27.6 and 20.7 years, 
respectively.”). 
118 Id. at Table 1.   
119 Id. at 336.  American jurors also tend to be middle-aged, white-collar workers or 
employees in a stable primary labor market, and of higher income.  See HIROSHI FUKURAI 
ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 
64 (1993). 
120 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 336.   
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reaction to the PRC, respondents were not as enthusiastic to serve 
initially.121   
An overwhelming majority of PRC members (96.9%) supported 
the requirement of prosecutorial explanations after a decision that 
indictment is in fact proper.122  However, only 53.0% of PRC members 
who had meaningful deliberative experiences believed that the 
participation of prosecutors would assist in the decision making 
process.123  In addition, 29.1% of the PRC members with deliberative 
experience also indicated that participation by Japanese prosecutors is not 
necessary for reaching a decision.  These findings may prove relevant for 
the lay assessor system, where both professional and lay judges deliberate 
together to determine the trial outcome.  Surprisingly, an overwhelming 
majority (97.0%) of PRC members with deliberative experiences favor the 
imposition of a confidentiality rule on all PRC participants.124  
C. Perceptions about Lay  Participation125 
 PRC members’ attitudes and perception about lay participation in 
a lay justice trial were also examined.  My analysis focused on the 
statistical significance of differences in responses between PRC members 
with and without deliberative experiences, as well as between male and 
female PRC members within each group.  The majority of PRC 
respondents expressed their willingness to serve as lay assessors (except 
PRC women without deliberative experiences).  This finding is higher 
than the results of a similar poll, taken at the similar period, on people’s 
lay participatory enthusiasm in Japan.  The 2006 national survey by the 
Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government showed that, among 1,795 
randomly chosen Japanese citizens, only 5.6% wanted to serve, while 
15.2% indicated they were more or less willing to serve as lay 
assessors.126  Those with deliberative experiences are more enthusiastic 
about lay participation than those without deliberative experience and 
male respondents were more willing to serve than women PRC members 
at a statistically significant level (p<.05).  Nearly all PRC members 
                                                 
121 Id. tbl.2.   
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Many of the findings in this Part were published in my past paper.  Id. at 337-41.  Here 
I provide unpublished findings concerning lay participation, such as statistical analyses of 
the differences in attitudes between male and female PRC members.   
126 Saiban-in seido ni kansuru tokubetsu yoron chōsa no gaiyō [Outline of the Special Poll 
Concerning the Lay Assessor System], NAIKAKUFU SEIFU KŌHŌSHITSU [PUBLIC RELATIONS 
SECTION OF THE CABINET OFFICE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT], 3 (Feb. 2006), 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/tokubetu/h18/h18-saiban.pdf. 
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indicated that they would be willing to participate if it was their duty to 
serve.127 
 The large majority of PRC members also felt that active legal 
engagement by local residents in lay participation might function as an 
effective deterrent against crimes in their communities, as well against 
overzealous prosecutions and inequitable judgments in criminal trials.  
PRC members with deliberative experience felt more strongly than those 
without deliberative experience that lay participation would be a stronger 
deterrent against prosecutorial bias and inequitable outcomes in court at a 
statistically significant level (p<.05). 
 The respondents answered questions regarding work 
responsibilities and whether they presented obstacles or barriers to 
participation.  More than three-quarters of all PRC members felt that it 
would be easier for them to serve if they could pick the date of jury 
service six months in advance.128  While all PRC members showed a 
willingness to participate, participatory experience in deliberation led to a 
higher—and statistically significant—level of participatory enthusiasm 
(p<.05).  In addition, the majority of both PRC groups felt that their 
employers showed understanding towards jury duty.129 
 The survey then examined respondents’ confidence in civilians to 
fulfill the responsibilities of jury duty, such as to deliver a fair verdict and 
to remain objective in evaluating evidence.  Male PRC members 
consistently showed greater confidence than female PRC members in 
laypersons’ abilities to determine both verdict and penalty and to evaluate 
objectively facts and evidence despite potentially prejudicial media 
reports.  Male PRC members were also less likely than female PRC 
members to feel overwhelmed in judging defendants and punishing them 
for their crimes (p<.10).  At the same time, PRC members with 
deliberative experience felt less burdened by the responsibilities of lay 
participation than those without deliberative experiences. 130   This 
difference in perception between the two PRC groups is statistically 
significant (p<.01).  The majority of both PRC groups also expressed 
doubts about the lay assessor system as the most appropriate adjudicative 
method and fear of rendering wrongful judgments.  Nevertheless, PRC 
members with deliberative experiences consistently shared less fear, 
uncertainty, and doubt about the risks of wrongful verdicts than those 
without deliberative experiences.  
 The majority of both PRC groups also voiced great concern about 
threats to their personal safety as a result of lay participation, possibly for 
                                                 
127 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 339.   
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130 Id. 
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fear of retaliation by the convicted defendant and/or their families and 
dependents.131  While male PRC respondents with deliberative experience 
showed greater confidence in their ability to make a fair judgment in such 
situations than those without deliberative experience, PRC members 
generally remain fearful of potential retaliation by defendants and their 
families. 
D. Confidence in the Criminal Justice System and the News 
Media 
 The survey findings are consistent with the proposition that 
people with jury experience tend to show a higher level of confidence in 
the system of government and justice. 132   PRC members expressed 
overwhelming confidence in prosecutors and courts, regardless of any 
difference in deliberative experience.133  PRC members’ confidence in 
both the police and defense attorneys was considerably heightened by 
participation in deliberative participation, except for female PRC members 
without deliberative experience.  Deliberative experience also elevated 
PRC members’ confidence in lay assessors for both genders.    
 As compared to the high level of confidence that flowed from 
PRC members’ deliberative participation, confidence in the media 
remained relatively low.  An interesting finding is that deliberative 
experience lowered PRC women’s confidence in both newspapers and 
televisions, while deliberative participation elevated the level of 
confidence in public media among PRC men. 
E. Lessons from PRC Participation and Experience 
Survey responses and follow-up, person-to-person interviews 
revealed that many PRC members reflected on their experiences and 
provided what they have learned from their participatory experience and 
useful information that helped facilitate their critical review of criminal 
cases, in which the Japanese prosecution exercised the discretion in 
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 See generally John Gastil et al., Seeing is Believing: The Impact of Jury Service on 
Attitudes Toward Legal Institutions and the Implications for International Jury Reform 18-
20 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with East Asia Law Review); cf. Mark West & John 
Gastil, Deliberation at the Margins: Participant Accounts of Face-to-Face Public 
Deliberation at the 1999-2000 World Trade Protests in Seattle and Prague, 5 
QUALITATIVE RES. REP. IN COMM. 1, 1-2 (2004) (discussing the connection between public 
deliberation and civic engagement with regard to the WTO protests). 
133 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 340 Table 4 (“An interesting finding is the near complete 
confidence expressed by Japanese PRC respondents in prosecutors (99.2% and 100.0% for 
those with and without deliberative experience, respectively) . . . .”).     
26 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 6 
 
decisions not to bring indictment charges.  Many PRC members also 
provided what had assisted them in facilitating their participatory duties 
for the duration of six month  
A fifty-seven-year-old, male company employee who served in 
the PRC twenty-two years ago, reflected on his experience, stating that the 
participatory experience “enabled me to study and learn legal problems 
and issues. At the same time, it gave me a very different worldview.”  A 
fifty-two-year-old man, who worked on his family business and served as 
a PRC member five years ago, stated, “To tell you the truth, I was 
extremely nervous at the beginning.  However, a pamphlet and video at 
the courthouse helped me understand my duty. . . .  [The participatory 
experience] is something I truly cherish today, especially enabling me to 
understand the structural mechanism and legal relations among the 
prosecution, the court system, and the police.”  A sixty-one-year-old, male 
restaurant owner said, “My wife’s support was crucial as we own our own 
business, which also narrowed the scope of my life-experience.  This duty 
expanded my knowledge and enabled me to visit different institutions and 
facilities unrelated to my ordinary daily activities.”  Another seventy-two-
year-old man, who served thirteen years ago, indicated, “While my life 
had no direct connection to the legal world, I was ecstatic when I first read 
investigative reports. With the encouragement from the PRC support staff, 
I remember that I attended the second meeting with tremendous 
enthusiasm.”   
An eighty-five-year-old woman, who served as a PRC member 
twenty-five years ago, stated, “This participatory experience helped 
eliminate the strict and authoritative image of the court, enlarge the 
friendship circle, and expand my vision.”  A sixty-eight-year-old woman, 
who served when she was twenty-six years old, stated, “I acquired a better 
understanding of the function of the prosecution and police as 
governmental organizations, as well as procedural formalities.”  Another 
fifty-eight-year-old woman, who is a homemaker and served when she 
was forty-six, complained about her PRC experience, declaring, “I had 
extreme difficulties in understanding the content of court records because 
many specialized terminologies were used. While I tried to use the statute 
books, I routinely had a headache during discussions and got me truly 
exhausted.”  Another seventy-six-year-old man, who was a certified tax 
accountant when he served as a PRC member fifteen years ago, indicated, 
“my experience as a public servant for forty years helped acquire 
sufficient knowledge for the job and helped perform my duty smoothly.”  
A sixty-six-year-old man who served in the Kanagawa PRC in 
2001 indicated that he became the first person to serve while he worked in 
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the National Defense Academy.134  Even though the first meeting failed to 
create a lively deliberative atmosphere, “the active interaction of opinions 
and views were common from the second meeting.”135  When asked of the 
requirement that the prosecutors must explain their non-indictment 
decision following the PRC decision to indict the suspect under the new 
system, he stated, “The PRC has the right to know the prosecutors’ 
rationale for their non-prosecutorial decision.  It will serve as an important 
informative basis for future deliberations.” 136   A fifty-two-year-old 
woman who served in the Aichi PRC twenty-two years ago stated that the 
most memorable part of my PRC duty was that, “I realized the existence 
of such an important participatory system, as I was totally ignorant of 
it.”137  As to public knowledge on the PRC system, she said “when I tried 
to talk about my experience, a few people responded by saying that ‘I 
have seen it on TV,’ and I feel not many people know about the 
system.”138 
A sixty-nine-year-old woman, who was a company employee 
when she served in the Kyoto PRC, said that the PRC experience posed “a 
new challenge to the world of which I had no knowledge, though I knew 
that [the experience] will definitely help me reconnect to my society, and 
my involvement will bring benefits to the overall process.”  Another fifty-
nine-year-old woman, who owned her own business when she served in 
the Kyoto PRC, indicated that she was always doubtful whether or not she 
was able to truly get involved in the investigative process without making 
any errors.  She stated, “[i]f those cases directly affect me, I will be doing 
whatever necessary to solve the problems.  But they are not.  I felt I must 
strive to do the best and study for the betterment until the day I die.”  A 
fifty-eight-year-old woman who owned her family business and served in 
the Kyoto PRC stated that the PRC experience “helped raise my curiosity 
on legal matters and I was able to incorporate and apply my common 
sense knowledge to the deliberative debates, especially from the 
perspective of an ordinary citizen.” 
A sixty-four-year-old man, who was a company employee when 
he served in the PRC, participated in the investigation of a traffic accident 
case that resulted in death, indicating his realization from the deliberative 
session that it “introduced many different viewpoints and opinions 
                                                 
134 Interview by Naoko Tamura with Toshichika Usui (Dec. 14, 2005) (on file with the 
author). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Interview by Naoko Tamura with Mieko Narita (Dec. 13, 2005) (on file with the 
author). 
138 Id. 
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through active participation by other members, all of which helped 
produce the equitable final recommendation.”  
As noted, the positive responses of PRC members towards their 
legal experiences and their willingness for future participation comport 
with previous research findings that jury experience contributes to positive 
attitudes towards the criminal justice system.139  Despite this greater 
confidence, which manifests itself in PRC members’ willingness to serve, 
civilian legal participants are subject to strict confidentiality requirements 
under Lay Assessor and PRC laws.140  The disclosure by lay assessors of 
deliberation secrets or secrets learned during deliberation can result in 
severe penalties and imprisonment as stipulated in the Lay Assessor 
Act.141  The PRC Act takes after the Lay Assessor Act in imposing 
penalties and imprisonment on PRC members for disclosure of 
deliberation related secrets.     
It bears emphasis, however, that lay assessor participation has not 
been widely publicized.  As less than 20% of PRC members indicated that 
lay assessor duties were widely known in their communities, the 
probability that the lay duty of the prosecutorial review commission is 
known and recognized in Japan is certainly low.142  To increase the public 
exposure of the lay assessor system and to dispel the apprehension of 
individuals selected for PRC duty, the Ministry of Justice along with the 
Supreme Court and the JFBA engaged in outreach and sponsored 
approximately 4,000 forums and symposiums, which attracted about 
200,000 attendees.143  These efforts perhaps pale in comparison to those 
undertaken prior to the first jury trial in 1928 in Japan.  At the time, the 
pre-war Japanese government held 3,339 nation-wide lectures and forums 
to educate the public, attracting a total of 1.2 million attendees144 and 
produced and distributed over 8 million copies of educational pamphlets 
and materials on jury service.145  To get a sense of the magnitude and 
scope of the government’s efforts in the past, it is important to note that 
                                                 
139 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.   
140 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 341.   
141 Lay Assessor Act, supra note 71, art. 79. 
142 See Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu [Cabinet Office for Public Relations], Kensatsu 
shinsakai seido ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Public Opinion Poll on the PRC System] (Oct. 
1990), http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h02/H02-10-02-15.html (providing results of national 
survey, which showed that almost 70% of respondents had no knowledge of the PRC 
system).   
143 Fukurai, supra note 24, at 342 (citing Press Release, Homusho [Ministry of Justice], 
Daijin kakugi go kishakaiken no gaiyō [Outline of Press Meeting by Minister] (Mar. 17, 
2006), http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/243775/web.moj. 
go.jp/SPEECH/POINT/sp060317-01.html).  
144 Id. 
145 TAKASHI MARUTA, SAIBAN-IN SEIDO [THE LAY ASSESSOR SYSTEM] 187 (2004). 
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only 3% of the entire Japanese population was even eligible for jury 
service.146   
V. DISCUSSION:  FUTURE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE LAY 
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETION OF 
PROSECUTION 
While the PRC still remains virtually unknown to the Japanese 
citizenry, the binding power provided by the new PRC law has the 
potential to transform this all-citizen review commission into a position of 
political prominence and to enable the commission to act as an influential 
legal institution.  Indeed, with its binding power, the new PRC is legally-
equipped with the authority, not only to review the propriety of 
prosecutorial discretion, but also to reverse prosecutors' non-indictment 
decisions involving misconduct or crimes committed by people in local 
communities including foreign residents.  For example, the PRC in 
Okinawa has the potential to alter the criminal prosecution of incidents 
and the crimes committed by military personnel and thus, to enable the 
residents of Okinawa to gain legal and judicial independence, not only 
from the military domination of the entire island, but also from Japan's 
political and corporate influence. 
In the past, the Japanese prosecutor was prevented from initiating 
the legal prosecution of military personnel and/or their dependents, due 
(1) to the secret intergovernmental agreement that prevented potential 
prosecutions of certain less serious crimes committed by military 
personnel; or (2) to logistical and investigative incapacities to issue an 
indictment that resulted from the protected custody, which the military 
provided to shield suspected soldiers from thorough investigations by 
Japanese prosecutors or police. 
Aside from their inability to issue a proper indictment in military-
related cases, Japanese prosecutors also have been reluctant to issue an 
indictment in criminal cases involving powerful Japanese politicians, their 
governmental allies or associates, and economic elites with deep political 
clout and business influence.  For example, in March 2005, a citizen 
complaint was filed to review the non-indictment decision in an illegal 
political donation case against then Former Vice President of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Taku Yamasaki, who stated that he received ¥50 
million donation from the Japan Dentist Association (JDA) in a paper bag 
and kept it in his locker for a month.147  Despite evidence of the false 
                                                 
146 Id.   
147 Reiji Yoshida, LDP Body Accused of Hiding Donations with Faked Receipts, JAPAN 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ 
nn20041019a1.html. 
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receipts, the JDA's director general’s admission of money delivery 
instructions, and Yamasaki's own admission that he personally received 
the money, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office decided in 
January 2005 not to prosecute Yamasaki.  A complaint was filed to review 
the non-indictment decision in March 2005.148  The Second Tokyo PRC 
issued an "indictment is proper" resolution in July 2005.149  While the 
prosecutors reopened the case against Yamasaki, in less than two months 
they again decided not to prosecute them.150  
Such prosecutorial reluctance emerged despite the fact that 
investigations often revealed incontrovertible evidence that individuals of 
high regards indeed had engaged in bribery, scandalous illegal political 
donations, insider trading, egregious misfeasance, bid-rigging in public 
construction projects, abuse of political power, or other illegal conduct 
and unethical behavior.151  Many political and business elites were able to 
escape indictment because Japanese prosecutors were oftentimes forced to 
make politically-calculated decisions not to prosecute people of prominent 
social status and power.  The controversial shobun seikun (special requests 
for instructions on prosecutorial steps to be taken) system of responsibility 
within the Japanese prosecutor’s office, for example, has led to the 
dismissal of many political cases or from the termination of further 
investigation.  Karel von Wolferen, who wrote The Enigma of Japanese 
Powers, once stated, "Individual prosecutors … are expected, before 
taking action against influential officials, ministers, Diet members or local 
government leaders, to write preliminary reports for their supervisors all 
the way up to the ministry of justice, and to wait for their consent."152  The 
interconnected networks of the bureaucratic decision-making process 
within the Japanese government often result in the outright dismissal of 
the criminal charges or circumvention of the periphery of legal definitions 
                                                 
148 Inquest Panel Says LDP's Yamasaki Deserves Indictment, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, 
July 27, 2005. 
149 Id. 
150 Tsutomu Nanbara & Atsuko Kobayashi, Revised Prosecution Law Reflects Public 
Sentiments, DAILY YOMIURI, June 4, 2009, at 4 (reviewing the non-indictment decision by 
the prosecution against Taku Yamasaki, stating that “[i]n connection with the dubious 
political donations involving former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki and the JDF, the 
committee decided in favor of indictment” but that “the prosecution did not alter its 
decision not to prosecute”). 
151 Id; see also DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING CRIME IN 
JAPAN 130-32 (2002) (observing the Japanese prosecutor’s use of the “kessai” system that 
requires Japanese prosecutors to seek consultation and approval from their superiors in 
“managing and coordinating” the prosecution of criminal defendants of “high profile 
cases”); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWERS 224-25 (1990) 
(observing that many political corruption cases in Japan were dismissed by the Japanese 
prosecutors). 
152 Van Wolferen, supra note 151, at 223-24. 
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to ensure that prosecutorial axes were laid on insignificant issues or less-
important activities. 
In many politically charged cases, it takes well-organized civic 
efforts from outside the political and business establishment to force 
prosecutors to issue indictments against political heavyweights.  However, 
there is a new and different strategy available against prosecutorial "non-
action," illustrated in the following example. 
A. Misfeasance Allegation Against Political Heavyweights153 
Many public school teachers in Tokyo have been recently 
dismissed by Governor Shintaro Ishihara and his officers because they 
refused to salute the flag of the rising sun and sing the national anthem at 
graduation and enrollment ceremonies.154  Governor Ishihara remains a 
famous celebrity in Japanese politics.  His deceased brother was a pop 
icon for many decades and Ishihara is known to use his connections in the 
media industry and influential political circles to advance his conservative 
political agenda and pro-business economic policies.155  Many school 
teachers decided to protest the top-down, politically motivated directive to 
stand up and face the flag and sing the national anthem, despite the 
punishment that Governor Ishihara had authorized the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Board of Education to impose.  In 2004, 243 teachers were 
punished for their disobedience156 and by March 2009, 422 schoolteachers 
have been either fired or punished for their disobedience.157 
Many dismissed teachers, their families, and their lawyers 
organized to form a political alliance and decided to file an official 
complaint with the prosecutor's office in 2004 against Governor Ishihara 
and his superintendents who sit on the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of 
                                                 
153 The incident discussed in this Part was mentioned briefly in my earlier paper.  Fukurai, 
supra note 24, 329-30.  I again summarize the key facts here.   
154 Tokyo Teachers to Sue Education Board over Compulsory Anthem Singing, JAPAN 
ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Jan. 24, 2004. 
155 See, e.g., Ishihara gundan Ishinomaki de otoko no takidashi [Ishihara Promotions and 
the Emergency Kitchen at Ishinomaki], SPORTS HOCHI (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://hochi.yomiuri.co.jp/entertainment/news/20110415-OHT1T00006.htm (indicating 
many prominent actors such as Tetsuya Watari, Hiroshi Tachi, and Masaki Kanda in the 
Ishihara Promotions all worked with Yujiro Ishihara and supported his brother Shintaro 
Ishihara in his political campaigns).   
156 Norimitsu Onishi, Tokyo’s Flag Law:  Proud Patriotism, or Indoctrination? N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16. 2004, at A1. 
157 HIKAIKOSHA NO KAI, KIMIGAYO KYŌSEI KAIKO SAIBAN KEIKA [THE PROGRESS OF THE 
LAWSUITS ARISING FROM FIRINGS RELATED TO THE FORCED SINGING OF THE NATIONAL 
ANTHEM] (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.ne.jp/asahi/office/takeda/kimigayo-saiban.html. 
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Education.158  However, the teachers’ demand for accountability was met 
with great resistance.  The teachers had to submit their complaints five 
times until prosecutors finally agreed to meet them and hear their 
grievance and complaints, despite the dictates of applicable criminal 
procedure.  Section 241(2) of Japan’s Criminal Code of Procedure 
specifically requires that when a complaint or an accusation is made orally, 
a police officer or public prosecutor is required to make a written 
statement of such a complaint.159  More importantly, Section 242 of the 
criminal code does not permit prosecutors to refuse a complaint and 
thereby requires a criminal investigation and the announcement of 
results.160   
On December 28, 2005, after investigative deliberation, the 
prosecutor announced the decision not to indict, so in February 2006, the 
dismissed teachers filed a complaint with the PRC in Tokyo.161  The 
Tokyo PRC deliberated the complaint and finally decided in November 
2006 that the original non-indictment decision was proper, but also issued 
a rebuke against Ishihara and his subordinates, suggesting their actions 
were “heavy handed.”162  Meanwhile, in another civil case filed by the 
dismissed teachers, on September 21, 2006, the Tokyo District Court 
ordered the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to compensate the teachers 
because Ishihara’s government, under the directive of the Tokyo Board of 
Education, unfairly punished them.163   
Despite the commission's exculpatory decision on the misfeasance 
allegation of political elites and governmental heavyweights, the above 
case clearly demonstrated that the PRC has the legal authority to play a 
significant role in politically sensitive cases involving possible 
governmental misconduct and the abuse of power by public officials.  The 
                                                 
158 Japanese Teachers Bring Legal Action Against Governor over Flag, Anthem, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2004. 
159 KEIJISOSHŌHŌ [C. CRIM. PRO.] art. 241(2) ("A public prosecutor or judicial police 
official shall make a written statement when they have received an oral complaint or 
accusation."). 
160 Id. art. 242 ("A judicial police officer shall, when they have received a complaint or 
accusation, send the document and articles of evidence regarding the complaint or the 
accusation to a public prosecutor immediately."). 
161 Noboru Ashizawa, Hinomaru, kimigayo no kyōsei wa yurusanai [No Compulsion 
Regarding Japan's National Flag and National Anthem], JAPAN ALTERNATIVE NEWS FOR 
JUSTICES AND NEW CULTURES (Feb. 28, 2006), 
http://www.janjan.jp/government/0602/0602269930/1.php.  
162 Kokkikokka de “fukiso wa sōtō” giketsu: “Komuin no shokumu suikō wo” to kensatsu 
shinsakai [On Issues of Rising-sun Flag and National Anthem, 'Non-Indictment is Proper,' 
Focus on the Prosecution of Duties, According to the PRC Decision], SEESAA BLOG, Dec. 
12, 2006, http://mondlicht.seesaa.net/article/ 
30078288.html. 
163 City Hall to Appeal ‘Kimigayo’ Ruling, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 23, 2006, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060923a2.html. 
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PRC will have an equally powerful impact on the critical evaluation of 
prosecutors' non-indictment decisions involving allegedly criminal 
activities of military personnel and their dependents in Okinawa. 
 
B. Indictment of Military Personnel and Their Dependents 
 
For cases of criminal negligence or misconduct by military 
personnel in Okinawa, the local PRC can critically examine the non-
indictment decisions by the prosecution.  In Okinawa Prefecture, there are 
three prosecutorial review commissions located on three separate islands:  
(1) the Naha PRC in Naha City, Okinawa’s capital city; (2) the Hirara 
PRC in the Island of Miyako; and (3) the Ishigaki PRC in the Island of 
Ishigaki.164  As the major American military bases are established and 
operated on the island of Okinawa, the PRC in Naha City is the primary 
recipient of citizens’ complaints and grievances concerning criminal 
conduct of military personnel in Okinawa. 
Okinawa hosts thirty-seven of the eighty-eight American military 
bases in Japan, covering a total area of 233 square kilometers and 
representing 75% of the territory occupied by U.S. military facilities in 
Japan.165  This is despite the fact that Okinawa represents less than 1% of 
Japan's total land area.  The highly concentrated placement of the 
American military establishment in Okinawa has historically created a 
multitude of social and legal problems, including the proliferation of 
crimes committed by military personnel.  Indeed Okinawa residents have 
witnessed a long history of foreign soldiers, and their families stationed in 
the island, victimizing the local community.  The U.S.–Japanese Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) nonetheless effectively shielded military 
felons from extraterritorial application of U.S. law, thereby effectively 
sidestepping Japanese law.166 
                                                 
164 List of All Prosecutorial Review Commissions in Japan, supra note 76. 
165 Okinawa:  Effects of Long-Term US Military Presence:  History of U.S. Military 
Presence, OKINAWA WOMEN ACT AGAINST MILITARY VIOLENCE, 1 (2007), 
http://www.genuinesecurity.org/partners/report/Okinawa.pdf (“Seventy-five percent of the 
U.S. military facilities in Japan are located in Okinawa, although Okinawa is only 0.6% of 
the land area of Japan.”).  
166 CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS:  THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 180-81 
(2006) (“All servicemen in Okinawa know that if, after committing a rape, robbery, or 
assault, they can make it back to base, they will remain in American custody until indicted 
even if the Japanese execute a warrant for their capture.”); New Okinawa Hit-and-Run 
Strains U.S.-Japan Alliance, ANPO (Nov. 22, 2009), http://anpomovie.com/en/?m=200911 
(“[T]he SOFA unfairly protects U.S. service personnel from the consequences of their 
behavior.”).   
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The new PRC offers the potential to ensure that military personnel 
who commit heinous crimes against Okinawans will be fairly indicted and 
prosecuted.167  After the Japanese prosecutors decide not to take action 
against American soldiers, individual citizens can initiate an indictment by 
submitting a complaint or accusatory claim to a police officer or a 
prosecutor in Okinawa.  As stated earlier, Section 242 of the Japanese 
Criminal Code of Procedure requires that, upon receipt of a complaint or 
accusation, a judicial police report is required to forward promptly the 
documents and related evidence to the attention of the prosecutor.168  
Similarly, Section 260 requires that, once the prosecutor has made the 
non-prosecution decision, the prosecutor must promptly notify the person 
who filed the original complaint.169  Section 261 also specifies that the 
prosecutor must promptly notify the reason for the non-indictment to the 
individual or party who filed the original complaint or accusation of the 
reason for the non-indictment decision.170 
When the original complainant decides to pursue the case, he or 
she then may submit a citizen’s complaint of prosecutors’ non-indictment 
decision to the PRC.  A judicial panel comprised of local residents chosen 
at random from the local community is then empowered to examine the 
merit of the complaint, summon witnesses if necessary, and deliberate on 
the prosecutor’s non-indictment decision.   
If the PRC’s second decision recommends indictment of military 
personnel, the Japanese government must begin the criminal prosecution 
of alleged American soldiers.  Of course, the alleged crime committed by 
military personnel must be legally classified as heinous or of material 
significance, in order to support the adjudication of the lay assessor panel. 
Once an American soldier is indicted, the soldier will face a lay 
assessor trial, regardless of whether or not there has been an admission of 
                                                 
167 The PRC will have the potential to influence the prosecutorial decisions despite the 
recent discovery of the secret Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that has been signed 
between the Japanese and American governments.  Japanese historian Shoji Niihara 
discovered the 1957 secret agreement between both governments, in which the Japanese 
government renounced the jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses committed by 
military personnel.  According to Niihara, such a bilateral agreement forced the Japanese 
prosecutors from making indictment decisions in many serious crimes committed by U.S. 
servicemen in the past. 
168 KEIJISOSHOŌHŌ [C.CRIM. PRO.] art. 242. 
169 Id. art. 260 (“When a public prosecutor has instituted prosecution or made a disposition 
not to institute prosecution regarding a case with respect to which a complaint, accusation 
or claim has been filed, the public prosecutor shall notify the person who filed the 
complaint, accusation or claim promptly.”). 
170 Id. art. 261 (“If, in a case with respect to which complaint, accusation or demand has 
been lodged, or disposition not to institute a public action has been made, a public 
prosecutor shall, upon request, of the complainant, accuser or person who made the 
demand, promptly inform them of the reasons therefore.”). 
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guilt.  In either case, the lay assessor panel with a differing number of 
professional and lay judges will adjudicate the crime.  If the solder pleads 
not guilty, the judicial panel of three professional and six lay judges will 
listen to witnesses, examine material or forensic evidence presented by 
counsel, and evaluate any other relevant material or evidence pertinent to 
the case.  If the defendant pleads guilty to criminal charges, a panel of one 
professional and three lay judges will then evaluate the evidence in the 
case and determine the severity of the sentence. 
In addition to the possible indictment of American soldiers, the 
PRC can also play an equally powerful role in evaluating the involvement 
of the American military headquarters in Okinawa and Japanese 
governmental policies and joint military projects.  Such governmental 
endeavors include the construction of new installations and defense 
facilities on Okinawa Island, as well as military practices and exercises 
that caused health hazards and physical harm resulting in injuries to, and 
even deaths of, local residents. 
C. Okinawa and Environmental Devastation 
U.S. military bases and defense installations worldwide have 
caused significant environmental damage and pollution to nearby areas 
and surrounding regions.171  Okinawa remains no exception to the harmful 
environmental effects of the military presence and routine exercises by the 
armed units of the American forces on the island.  In 1947, base pollutions 
in Iheya led to the death of eight people from arsenic poisoning.172  Even 
after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, oil and fuel spills 
continued to cause significant environmental damages near American 
bases.173  Today, local residents learn of pollution and releases of harmful 
substances, only after the damages spill to the area that transcends the 
                                                 
171 See generally JUDY EHLEN & RUSSELL S. HARMON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF 
MILITARY OPERATIONS (2001).Cf. Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting 
from the NATO Military Action in Yugoslavia, 25 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 117, 118-19 
(2000) (detailing environmental damage caused by NATO’s bombing campaign of 
Yugoslavia).   
172 Hayashi Kiminori et al., Overcoming American Military Base Pollution in Asia:  Japan, 
Okinawa, Philippines, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL:  JAPAN FOCUS, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
173 Id; see also JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 173 (observing that the pollution was 
committed without fear of liability because Article 6 of Japan and South Korea SOFAs “is 
a typical and often deeply resented aspect of U.S. SOFAs and an invitation to the U.S. 
military to pollute in any way it wants without fear of accountability”); Today’s U.S. 
Military Bases in Okinawa,  
OKINAWA SUMMIT 2000 ARCHIVES, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/summit/a_la/ 
peace/beigun/index2.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (describing “[e]nvironmental 
pollution caused by red soil erosion and oil spills from military bases”).   
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boundary of military bases and into immediate surroundings.  At Kadena 
Air Base, the large jet fuel spill on May 25, 2007, which lasted for four 
days, provides a recent example of the massive environmental and 
ecological damages nearby residential areas and districts.174 
Serious environmental pollution and damage still linger at the 
former military bases areas that have been returned to Okinawa by the U.S. 
military.175  The former U.S. Communication Station at Onna Point, which 
was returned to the Japanese government in November 1995, was found to 
have an extremely high level of toxic substances, such as polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCB), cadmium, mercury, lead, and arsenic.176 
Numerous U.S. armed forces in the Fukuchi Dam's reservoir have 
polluted the water as a result of river crossing exercise, and thereby, 
threatened the daily activities of the majority of local residents on the 
island.  The Fukuchi dam provides water to the 1.2 million residents of the 
island.  Recent investigations have found that the water has been polluted 
by grenades, flares, and hundreds of paintballs used by American military 
personnel in training exercises.177  In 1997, the U.S. Marines also admitted 
to using depleted uranium munitions on the islands west of Kume Island 
in violation of the bilateral agreement on the Law for the Regulation of 
Nuclear Power in Japan.178 
Despite massive pollutants left behind by old military installations 
and significant environmental damages caused by training exercises of the 
U.S. military, the American government remains immune from potential 
prosecution or even the required restorative process necessary to remedy 
the environmental devastation.  Article VI of SOFA indicates that the U.S. 
military does not bear any responsibility for repairing or restoring any 
damage to the environment, specifying that "[t]he United States is not 
obliged . . . to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they 
were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, 
or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration."179  This SOFA 
provision unilaterally allows the U.S. military to damage with impunity 
                                                 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOV’T, U.S. MILITARY 
ISSUES IN OKINAWA (2004), available at http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/ 
site/contents/attach/7005/pamphlet(English).pdf. 
177 Okinawa Dams Checked for Dangerous Objects, WEEKLY JAPAN UPDATE (Jan. 19 
2007), http://www.japanupdate.com/?id=7335.  
178 Ui Jun, U.S. Military Bases and Environmental Problems, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL: 
JAPAN FOCUS, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Ui_Jun-
U_S__Military_Bases_and_Environmental_Problems/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).  
179 Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security:  
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, art. 
IV, ¶ 1, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652. 
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the natural environment, natural resources, and delicate tropical 
ecosystems of the islands. 
The new proposed construction of an offshore U.S. military base 
off the coast of a small fishing village of Henoko also endangers a unique 
subtropical ecosystem and the biologically diverse marine life around the 
island of Okinawa.  In 1996, the American government agreed to close the 
much criticized Futenma Marine Corps Air Station which was located in 
the middle of very dense residential areas in the city of Ginowan.  The 
presence of the marine airfield has posed a health hazard and safety 
concern to local residents for decades.  The American government has 
insisted that its closure had to be contingent upon its relocation to Henoko 
in northern Okinawa.180 
Henoko is located in Nago City, which is the home of the old 
Marine Corps base of Camp Schwab.  A new, sea-based airfield facility 
will be constructed, including a 2,500 meter runway built on a coral reef, 
thereby eliminating potential protests from nearby residents over the 
danger of serious accidents and noises.181 Henoko's surrounding reef has 
been home to an endangered dugong classified in the Washington 
Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 
which requires a dugong and its habitat to be handled under the strictest of 
regulations.182   
After the Japanese government agreed to pay for the construction 
of the new airfield and began to create seabed drilling platforms over the 
coral reefs, nearly thirty thousand Okinawans and supporters from other 
Japanese prefectures and international environmental groups including 
Greenpeace engaged in a sit-in that temporarily halted logistical work 
prior to the full-scale construction process.  Some civic activists in diving 
suits tried to prevent the underwater construction by acting as a barricade 
to government divers and contractors hired by the state.  In April 2004, 
under the authority given by Naha Defense Facilities Administration 
Bureau (NDFAB) under the Japan Defense Facility Administration 
Agency (DFAA), the governmental agency and local companies 
subcontracted by the DFAA continued to conduct extensive drilling 
surveys of the military construction site, prior to the environmental 
assessment required by Japanese law. 
                                                 
180 David Allen & Chiyomi Sumida, ‘It’s Done,’ Rumsfeld Says of Troops Realignment 
Agreement for Okinawa, STARS AND STRIPES (Nov. 5, 2005), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/it-s-done-rumsfeld-says-of-troop-realignment-agreement-for-
okinawa-1.40607. 
181 Id. 
182 Joint Declaration to Save the Dugong and Protect Yambaru Against Construction of an 
Offshore US Military Base and Inland Helipads, ASS’N TO PROTECT THE NORTHERNMOST 
DUGONG (Jan. 2000), http://sea-dugong.org/ 
english/main/joint.html.  
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An underwater battle began.  During the massive protest, a group 
of Okinawan activists and civic groups decided to physically prevent 
governmental drilling activities and underwater surveys.  On numerous 
occasions off the bay of Henoko, underwater activists were physically 
assaulted by Japanese Self Defense Force divers.  Reverend Natsume 
Taira, one of the active protesters who tried to block the underwater 
environmental survey, was attacked and assaulted by Japanese Self 
Defense Force (JSDF) divers who turned off the oxygen valve on his 
scuba air tank, causing him to nearly drown.  JSDF divers and contracted 
divers also attacked other protesting divers by with hammers, kicking 
them, and pulling off their masks.183 
The newly installed power of the PRC resolution can offer a 
radically different strategy to protest and prevent this joint state-corporate 
project, which is perceived as detrimental to the social and political 
interests of Henoko’s local residents and other areas in Okinawa.184  For 
instance, civic activists and Okinawa residents, including protesting divers, 
can take full advantage of the PRC’s authority to review a prosecutor’s 
decision and therefore, feel empowered to file complaints with the local 
Prosecutors Office and to allege criminal behavior and felonious activities 
by JSDF divers and contracted divers who were privately hired to conduct 
an environmental assessment, and the private firms contracted by the 
government to assist in a drilling survey of the coral reef.  After a group of 
activists files a complaint or accusation of criminal conduct with local 
police officers or prosecutors, a prosecutor is required to make a written 
statement of such a complaint or accusation, investigate the alleged 
misconduct, and determine whether to file charges against the divers and 
workers hired by governmental agencies and contractors. 
If a politically motivated prosecutor rejects such arguments and 
returns a non-indictment decision, the citizen's complaint may be 
submitted to the PRC for reconsideration of the non-prosecution decision.  
The PRC must then call for a hearing and summon witnesses, including 
civic activists who participated in the protest, private and JSDF divers 
who allegedly attacked protesting civic divers, government officers who 
issued environmental surveys, and contractors who hired private divers.  
                                                 
183 Chris Salzberg, Japan:  Protester Nearly Killed at Henoko Bay, GLOBAL VOICES (July 
29, 2007), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/07/29/japan-protester-nearly-killed-at-
henoko-bay/.  
184 The conflict between Okinawan residents and both the Japanese and U.S. governments 
stems from a 1996 bilateral governmental decision to replace the existing Futenma U.S. 
military base with a sea-based facility off the east coast of Henoko in Okinawa.  See 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, THE SACO FINAL REPORT ON FUTENMA AIR 
STATION (AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SACO REPORT) (1996), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ 
security/96saco2.html. 
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The PRC can also question prosecutors and ask them for any additional 
evidence or information relevant to the case if necessary.  A judicial panel 
of eleven Okinawa residents chosen at random from the local community 
can then determine whether or not the prosecutors’ exercise of discretion 
in decision not to indict was a proper decision for the given case.  If the 
commission determines twice that the prosecution of the accused is proper, 
the commission's resolution becomes legally binding and forces the 
prosecutors to reverse the previous non-indictment decision.  The second 
recommendation also forces the prosecution to begin a formal criminal 
prosecution against both government and private divers and other relevant 
agencies, including private firms that provided logistical assistance to 
underwater environmental surveys.  In the case of a forced indictment, 
Japanese prosecutors are required to work collaboratively with court-
appointed lawyers in their supplementary investigations.  Based on 
materials and information collected from investigation, the lay assessors 
can then try a suspected party that is indicted under the forced indictment 
system and make a final determination on the criminal charges in question. 
It may be a long, arduous path protecting Okinawans and the 
environment—but the PRC provides an effective legal avenue to 
challenge joint state-corporate efforts that may harm Okinawans’ interests. 
D. Potential Problems of the PRC’s Power to Review 
Alleged Military Crimes 
There are two major obstacles to the PRC’s ability to review and 
reverse a prosecutorial decision involving military personnel and their 
dependents.  The first barrier is a recent phenomenon of judicial police 
officers or the public prosecutor ignoring, or even rejecting, an accusation 
or complaint filed by citizens.  Even if the complaint or accusation were 
accepted, public officers have been accused of abuse:  altering the content 
of the complaint to make it less significant, deliberately deciding not to act 
upon it, refusing to write a formal complaint to submit to their superiors, 
or requesting the original party to withdraw their complaint.185  Citizens 
recently complained about the large number of neglected or ignored 
complaints and accusations by Japanese prosecutors and police officers.  
The following case illustrates one such incident. 
In October 1999, twenty-one year old Japanese female college 
student Shiori Ino was murdered by the accomplice of her ex-boyfriend 
Kazuhiko Komatsu, a twenty-six year old who had a long history of 
                                                 
185 Police Chief Reprimanded Over Stalking Death Conduct, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20030321b4.html; Three Ex-Cops Sentenced for 
Avoiding Stalker Case, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20000908a5.html. 
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stalking Ino.186  Her murder exposed a series of neglected duties and 
obligations by the Saitama prefectural police, which, long before her 
murder, received multiple complaints that Komatsu was stalking Ino and 
her family.187 
Ino was followed for ten months and implored the Saitama police 
to look into her case, stating that her boyfriend was constantly stalking her 
after their break-up and that his friends distributed hundreds of handouts 
defaming her.  In July 1999, Ino finally decided to make a formal criminal 
complaint against the police for failing to look into the stalking and 
harassment allegations.  However, the police refused to act on the 
complaint and falsified an official report to make it look as if no official 
complaint had ever been filed. 188   Furthermore, after receiving the 
complaint, officers at Ageo Police Station in Saitama Prefecture wrote a 
final report stating Ino was merely being harassed, and thus, neglected to 
do the extra work to draft a formal complaint to be submitted to their 
superiors.189  An internal investigation also substantiated that three police 
officers altered Ino’s criminal complaint so they would not have to pursue 
the case.190 
Ino’s murder added momentum to the movement to enact an anti-
stalking law, which finally took effect in November 2000.191  Nevertheless, 
the dereliction of duties by public police officers is still very common.  In 
2005, JFBA surveyed trial lawyers about the dereliction of duties and 
obligations by police and prosecutors.  More than two-thirds of lawyers 
(70%) reported that police have refused to accept a complaint filed on 
behalf of their clients.192  An organized effort is necessary to ensure that 
police officers and prosecutors will properly review the content of a 
complaint filed by individual citizens.   
                                                 
186 Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Kin of Stalking Victim Seek Justice:  Parents Want Link 
Between Murder, Police Inaction Noted, JAPAN TIMES, June 12, 2003, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20030612a2.html; Victim Snubbed by Police:  
Ringleader in Coed Slaying Gets Life Term, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20031226a2.html. 
187 See Wijers-Hasegawa, supra note 187 (“After Ino filed a formal complaint, officers at 
Ageo Police Station in Saitama Prefecture wrote a report that she was merely being 
harassed so they could avoid the extra work involved in submitting a formal complaint to 
their superiors.  Three officers have been convicted for falsifying the report.”). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Kenichi Ino, Cops Sentenced for Ignoring Pleas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 7, 2000. 
191 See Case Sparked Anti Stalking Law: Two Get Long Sentences for ’99 Slaying, JAPAN 
TIMES, July 18, 2001, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20010718a5.html (“Partly as 
a result of the killing of Ino, the antistalking [sic] law took effect last November.”). 
192 Bengoshi no 53% ga Fuman:  Keisatsu no Kokuso eno taio [53% of Lawyers 
Dissatisfied by the Police Treatment of Complaints], CHUNICHI SHIMBUN, May 15, 2006, 
http://www6.big.or.jp/~beyond/akutoku/news/2006/0514-27.html. 
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The second barrier involves uncertainty with respect to how a 
Japanese prosecutor’s initial decision not to indict an American suspect 
should be interpreted within the framework of existing intergovernmental 
agreements, including the SOFA and other intergovernmental protocols, 
some of which still remain unearthed but may have the potential to exert 
significant impact on the interpretation of the proper legal status of 
American military personnel in a Japanese criminal proceeding. 
Given the uncertain legal status of American military personnel, a 
battle on the legal terrain may follow.  The American government may 
insist that the original non-indictment decision by the prosecutors’ office 
should be interpreted as the Japanese government’s decision to forfeit the 
further prosecution of military personnel, thereby nullifying the legality of 
the PRC’s subsequent recommendation for prosecution.  The Japanese 
government, on the other hand, may insist that the American government 
must respect the Japanese judicial system and legal culture, including the 
new PRC law and the legally binding status of individual citizens’ 
collective decision to indict and prosecute military personnel. 
In either case, legal and political contestation over the interpretive 
boundaries of applicable American and Japanese laws in determining the 
proper legal status of American military felons should be welcomed and 
further facilitated. These debates tend to expose the unequal balance of 
power embodied in intergovernmental agreements and the legal inequities 
that are part of the unilateral imposition of extra-territoriality, which 
operated to undercut local law and jurisdiction.  Given the long history of 
Okinawan residents’ victimization by the hands of American military 
personnel and their dependents and the failure of the American military to 
punish them properly, the PRC’s legally binding recommendation helps 
create a public forum.  At question are the equity of intergovernmental 
agreements on the special immunities and unilateral exemption from local 
prosecutorial processes, police interference, and/or other measures of legal 
constraint.  The public debate over the jurisdictional inequalities may also 
force the American and Japanese governments to hold discussions on the 
redeployment of military personnel and the reconstitution of military 
facilities within Japan.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Japan has had a dark history when it comes to the prosecution of 
political elites, government officials, and business executives with deep 
connection to political circles.  A civic panel of eleven residents in Hyogo 
Prefecture decided to break this mold and prosecute a deputy police chief 
under the enforced indictment system of the new PRC Law, which took 
effect in May 2009.  The prosecution of the deputy police chief was 
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followed by the PRC’s second indictment against three past presidents of 
the powerful Japan Railway company.  In both cases, Japanese public 
prosecutors repeatedly decided not to indict political and economic elites, 
despite a public outcry and strong popular demands for their prosecution.  
Finally, civic complaint by victims and their families to the PRC initiated 
a public hearing, and the PRC was able to review the incidents and issue 
the indictments in both cases.   
 This Article proposes new strategies for the PRC to function as an 
effective oversight institution for governmental decisions and activities in 
Japan.  Today’s PRC, which possesses legally binding power in its 
deliberative decision, can also offer the great potential to ensure that 
military personnel and Japanese government officials who commit 
nefarious crimes against ordinary citizens will be fairly indicted and duly 
prosecuted.  After prosecutors decide not to prosecute military personnel, 
a local complaint to the PRC against the non-prosecution decision can 
initiate an inquiry process and allow a citizens’ panel to review, challenge, 
and possibly reverse the prosecutors’ decision.  The PRC’s legally binding 
resolution has also become an important channel through which ordinary 
people’s moral sentiments⎯their sense of justice, fairness, and 
accountability—can be expressed, articulated, and reflected in the 
deliberation of criminal cases.  
